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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of bank regulation and ownership on the efficiency of banks in 
the emerging MENA region. The public and private view of bank regulation is tested along 
with the interaction of bank regulation and ownership. Results support the public view of bank 
regulation and suggest that both ownership concentration and supervisory power individually 
and interactively exert a positive influence on cost efficiency. Moreover, government 
ownership, capital stringency and market power have positive effects on cost efficiency, 
whereas activity restrictions and deposit insurance have opposite effects. Capital regulation and 
supervisory power improvements occurred since Basel II. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study examines the impact of bank regulation and ownership on the efficiency 
performance of banks in 12 countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
using data envelopment analysis (DEA) with a one-step maximum likelihood estimation. It is 
based on an unbalanced panel dataset covering 718 observations from 132 commercial banks 
over a period of 11 years (2002-2012). The financial markets are unique in the MENA region 
as compared to other parts of the world given the higher reliance on bank finance, and a 
continued high level of government ownership of banks especially in the oil exporting 
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countries. Therefore examining the effects of ownership and regulation on bank efficiency in 
this region is important. The specific research questions are: i) does bank regulation and 
activity restrictions relate to bank efficiency? ii) does ownership concentration as well as 
government and foreign ownership influence bank efficiency? iii) does the interaction amongst 
bank regulation and bank ownership impact bank efficiency? 
 
One important motivation of this study is take the recent global financial crisis (GFC) into 
consideration in assessing the impact of bank regulation on bank efficiency. The occurrence of 
the global crisis could directly affect market competitiveness and bank risk-taking, which in 
turn influence banking efficiency and stability (see Soedarmono et al. 2013). Moreover, the 
banking reform initiatives in the post-crisis period such as capital stringency and more intense 
banking supervision might alter risk-taking behavior and efficiency of a bank. Incidentally, the 
GFC is also followed by the implementation of the Basel II guidelines in the MENA region. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to see how the Basel II guidelines on bank capitalization, 
official supervisory power and market discipline influence bank efficiency in the post-crisis 
period.  
 
Our study adds firstly to the literature by investigating the impact of specific components of 
bank regulation and supervision on bank efficiency, testing the ‘private’ and ‘public’ view 
theories of bank regulation in the MENA region. Barth et al. (2006) argue that the ‘public 
view’ of bank regulation aims to maximize benefits to the general public and minimize 
financial losses which might impact the public at large, whereas with the ‘private’ view it 
suggests that regulation is set up to benefit particular interest groups such as the banks 
themselves or the politically well connected, which may suggest government owned banks. In 
prior literature we find that in some cases capital regulation is found to have a positive effect 
on bank efficiency (Barth et al. 2013; Chortareas et al. 2012), with activity restrictions having a 
negative effect on profit efficiency. On the other hand, opposite effects of capital regulation 
and activity restrictions are found by Pasiouras et al. (2009). This study uses data from the 
World Bank’s Global Banking, Regulation and Supervision Survey in 2011. This is the only 
available global dataset that captures regulatory reform initiatives after the financial crisis. 
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Secondly we add to the literature by considering the interaction of bank regulation and 
ownership effects on bank cost efficiency. Ownership effects were examined in the MENA 
region by Farazi et al. (2011) and Kobeissi et al. (2010), but not with bank regulation. The 
inter-dependence between bank regulation and ownership structure in explaining bank risk-
taking has been examined (e.g. Laeven et al. 2009; Haw et al. 2010) but surprisingly, no studies 
to date examine the effect of the interaction between ownership and bank regulation on bank 
efficiency. The ownership of banks is not important in the Basel regulation, even though a 
bank’s ownership structure might constrain the effectiveness of bank regulation (see Laeven et 
al., 2009). In regards to regulatory restrictions and supervisory practice there might be some 
regulatory benefits given to government owned banks, but this will not be captured without 
consideration of ownership and regulation together against bank efficiency. Another 
consideration here is that ownership is taken as a percentage rather than a dummy variable, 
meaning that the effects of ownership and regulation together can be measured more 
effectively. Given bank regulation has a broad application across all bank ownership types, we 
expect the findings to have policy implications. 
 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is predominantly bank based, with limited 
development of equities and corporate bonds other than for some of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries (OECD, 2009). For firms in the region, the level of long term debt as 
a percentage of total debt is extremely low in the MENA region, reportedly to be just 3.41% 
(Awartani et al. 2016). These features of the MENA financial systems, could be related to 
corporate borrowers in the region who have often had a level of opaqueness, where controlling 
shareholders have influenced the disclosure of information which has caused further 
asymmetric information concerns for suppliers of finance (Koldertsova, 2011). This has been 
improving though with the introduction of corporate governance standards in the region from 
2002, and as part of the resolution process after stock crashes in 2006 with the largest regional 
stock exchanges in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
2
  
 
The region is strategically placed between Asia, Africa and Europe with a number of 
significant trading canals such as the Suez, Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and BiSuez, Hormuz, Bab-
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el-Mandeb and Gibraltar (Bitar et al. 2016). In regards to the rate of transfer of ownership of 
banks in the region, it is considered low, even though Rocha et al. (2011) report that state 
ownership of banks has been on the decline and foreign bank ownership on the rise. The 
banking sector is therefore considered concentrated, with unique ownership and regulatory 
structures, and monopolistic competition (Turk-Ariss, 2009).
3
 The financial systems of the 
region are bank dominated with family ownership of banks common in the GCC countries, 
with the government owning a number of large banks (Ben Naceur and Omran, 2011). Within 
the region, a higher level of financial development is associated with lower levels of 
government ownership of banks, and more sound prudential regulation and supervision 
(Creane et al. 2003). We therefore also add to the literature by considering ownership 
concentration and ownership type effects on cost efficiency.  
 
The findings suggest some encouraging outcomes of the regulatory reform initiatives in 
relation to capital regulation and official supervisory power on cost efficiency, and thus support 
the ‘public view’ theory of bank regulation. However, activity restrictions show a weak 
negative relationship with cost efficiency, a finding that supports the ‘private view’ of bank 
regulation. Consistent with agency theory, ownership concentration is found to have a positive 
effect on cost efficiency, and that this effect is reinforced through greater official supervisory 
power. Contrary to the widely-held notion that government control causes greater agency 
conflicts, this study also finds government ownership having a positive effect on cost 
efficiency. The study results further suggest that capital stringency and supervisory power 
appeared to be more effective in enhancing bank efficiency in the post-GFC period. This might 
be due to the implementation of the Basel II guidelines and improved regulatory efforts in the 
post crisis era to enforce bank regulation more effectively. The evidence also confirms the 
significance of the interdependence between internal corporate governance mechanism (such as 
ownership concentration) and external governance mechanism (e.g., official supervisory 
power) in explaining bank efficiency. Interestingly imperfect competition does not seem to 
impede bank efficiency in the MENA region.  
 
                                                 
3
 The competition-stability hypothesis suggests that greater competition enhances bank efficiency through 
reducing monitoring costs and portfolio risk of a bank, and thus promotes soundness and stability of a bank (see 
Turk-Ariss, 2010b).   
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of literature, and 
section 3 outlines empirical specifications and data. Section 4 provides empirical results and 
analysis, and section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Regulatory reform and ownership structure in MENA banking: 
 
The regulatory reform initiatives in most MENA countries began in the 2000s under the 
sponsorship of the multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Basel Committee provides a structural framework for these 
initiatives in areas such as capital adequacy, disclosures, risk management, prudential 
regulation and corporate governance (OECD, 2009). These reforms were intended to reduce 
bank risk-taking behavior and to improve efficiency.  
 
The adoption of the Basel guidelines in the MENA region has tended to align with the level of 
sophistication of a country’s financial system (Rocha et al. 2011). The IMF (2008) observed 
that nearly 68% of the Middle Eastern and 55% of the African countries had complied with the 
Basel core principles. But more recently, Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012) observed a 92 percent 
regional compliance with Basel II provisions in relation to the disclosure of off-balance sheet 
items and risk management framework. The GCC countries have also made substantial 
progress in relation to higher provisioning rates, tightening of personal loans, and the 
disclosure and sharing of credit information by financial institutions via public credit registries 
or private credit bureaus (Ayadi et al. 2013). The supervisory authorities of a number of GCC 
countries tend to have greater independence, even though they cannot replace management or 
to declare a bank insolvent. Other major challenges for the region include weak political power 
of the central banks, poor enforcement of regulatory guidelines, and a lack of effective 
supervision with limited supervisory expertise (Rocha et al. 2011).  
 
2.2 Theoretical framework:  
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The theoretical literature about the relationship between bank regulation and bank efficiency is 
largely inconclusive. There is no underlying theoretical framework of bank regulation and 
agreement on what should be done to reform regulation (Allen et al. 2013). Two opposing 
perspectives by Barth et al. (2013) can explain these inconsistencies. Firstly, the ‘public 
interest view’ suggests that the government safeguards the interests of the public through 
regulating banking activities, which in turn promotes bank efficiency and helps to mitigate the 
prospect of market failures. Secondly, the ‘private interest view’ suggests that certain bank 
regulation is enacted or enforced to maximize the interests of a particular group, leading to a 
decline in bank efficiency. Regardless, there is a need to have a deeper analysis of the 
appropriate design of macro-prudential bank regulation (Allen et al. 2013).  
 
2.2.1 The public view of bank regulation 
Capital regulation is intended to discipline bank risk-taking and to promote bank efficiency. 
According to the ‘public interest view’, greater capital stringency requirements can cause entry 
barriers to newcomers, restrict competition, and force banks to take more prudent lending 
decisions, leading to greater bank efficiency (Agoraki et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the ‘private 
interest view’ suggests that the benefits of excessive capital regulation can be lower than the 
costs, because of greater rent extraction by governments, together with higher barriers to entry 
and higher opportunity cost of losing attractive investment opportunities (Barth et al. 2013). 
Moreover, stringent capital regulation might force owners/managers to pursue costly financing 
sources such as equity rather than deposits (Pasiouras et al. 2009), and to select a riskier 
investment portfolio in order to compensate for the loss of benefits from more capital 
requirements (Laeven et al. 2009), leading to poor bank efficiency. The empirical results on the 
effect of capital regulation seem inconclusive. For example, Pasiouras et al. (2009) and Sassi 
(2013) observe an inverse relationship between capital regulation stringency and bank 
efficiency, whereas Chortareas et al. (2012) and Barth et al. (2013) show a positive effect of 
capital regulation. Since the MENA region shows significant progress in the implementation of 
Basel II capital requirements and related capital regulation, this is likely to have brought a 
more disciplined approach in bank lending decisions, leading to improved bank efficiency. 
Therefore, we intend to test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Capital regulation has a positive influence on the cost efficiency of a bank.  
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The ‘public interest view’ suggests that powerful and independent bank supervisors/regulators 
have the incentive and expertise to enhance bank efficiency and to overcome market failures 
through implementing effective monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms and enforcing better 
corporate governance standards (Beck et al. 2006; Barth et al. 2013). On the other hand, the 
‘private interest view’ holds that powerful supervisors can influence banks to allocate credit to 
maximize private or political benefits (Beck et al. 2006), leading to a decline in bank 
efficiency. Moreover, as the ‘political/regulatory capture’ hypothesis suggests, politically 
connected supervisors may not have the incentive and power to promote bank efficiency 
through risk-taking restrictions or as a result of rent-seeking behavior of powerful banks in 
emerging economies (Agoraki et al. 2011). Available empirical literature appears to support the 
‘public interest view’. Pasiouras et al. (2009) and Chortareas et al. (2012) find that official 
supervisory power and independent supervisory authorities tend to enhance profit efficiency. 
Barth et al. (2013) find that supervisory power enhances bank efficiency only in the presence 
of independent supervisory authorities. Although Rocha et al. (2011) find that the MENA 
region had poor risk-based bank supervision and a lack of independence of the central bank, 
Pillar 2 of Basel II may have helped improve bank efficiency given its guidance in regards to 
bank supervision. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of official supervisory power on bank 
efficiency in the MENA region. This leads to the development of the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Official supervisory power is positively associated with cost efficiency of a bank.  
 
Activity restrictions (such as securities and insurance underwriting) are likely to have both 
positive and negative effects on bank efficiency. According to the ‘public interest view’, 
activity restrictions reduce moral hazard problems, discipline excessive risk-taking behavior of 
a bank, and restrict banks from becoming extremely large and complex that are ‘too big to 
monitor and discipline’ (Barth et al. 2013; Laeven et al. 2007). This eventually leads to an 
increase in bank efficiency. Nonetheless, the ‘private interest view’ suggests that increased 
activity restrictions might reduce the benefits of economies of scale and scope in gathering and 
processing information, providing diversified services to customers, and building reputational 
capital. Moreover, activity restrictions can reduce the possibilities of risk diversification and 
the involvement of non-interest income related activities (Agoraki et al. 2011), leading to a 
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decline in overall bank efficiency. The empirical evidence on this issue appears to be mixed. 
Barth et al. (2013) and Chortareas et al. (2012) find tighter restrictions on bank activities 
having an adverse effect on bank efficiency, whereas Pasiouras et al. (2009) find an opposite 
effect. We predict an inverse effect of activity restriction on bank efficiency, because a higher 
degree of restrictions reduces the prospects of diversification and non-interest income related 
activities where the scope of activities may be undertaken in a more efficient manner. Based on 
this discussion, we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Activity restrictions are inversely related to cost efficiency of a bank.  
 
 
Deposit insurance is an important part of the regulatory structure that limits the risk of bank 
runs and enhances the safety and soundness of a banking system. Despite this, deposit 
insurance creates a moral hazard problem by limiting a bank’s downside risk and encouraging 
risk-taking (Forssbæck, 2011) with less incentive for insured depositors to monitor bank 
behavior. This, in turn, can impede bank efficiency in the long-term. Allen and Carletti (2013) 
question the effectiveness of deposit insurance, and advocate some other alternative 
mechanisms (such as the lender of last resort policies) to deal with liquidity concerns when a 
bank run is likely to occur. Since most of the MENA countries do not have explicit deposit 
insurance, deposit insurance is not predicted to have an impact on bank efficiency.  
 
2.2.2 The ‘private’ view of bank regulation 
Market discipline reduces the detrimental effects of a concentrated banking market and the 
ensuing risk-taking behavior of banks (Haw et al. 2010). According to the ‘private interest 
view’ (Barth et al. 2006, 2013; Beck et al. 2006), appropriate regulatory initiatives relating to 
the disclosure of reliable, comprehensive and consolidated information on bank activities and 
risk management practices tend to reduce information asymmetry with the discipline coming 
from investors and other suppliers of funds, as opposed to regulators. This in turn, enhances the 
ability and incentive of the private investors to monitor bank activities and governance 
practices, leading to an improvement in bank efficiency. In support of the ‘private interest 
view’, most empirical evidence (e.g., Barth et al. 2013; Pasiouras et al. 2009) find market-
based disclosures and monitoring have a positive effect on bank efficiency.  
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In the MENA region, Bourgain et al. (2012) find that financial disclosure increases the 
likelihood of a bank adopting sound risk management practices, only in the presence of high 
financial openness. Nonetheless, Duarte et al. (2008), observe that market discipline 
mechanisms might have an adverse effect on bank efficiency, because of the direct and indirect 
costs of extensive disclosures, and the release of sensitive information to the competitors. 
Further evidence in support of this was found by Chortareas et al. (2012) for European banks. 
Considering a recent change in the regulation of MENA countries relating to the disclosure of 
off-balance sheet items and risk management practices (Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2012), we 
expect that market discipline has a positive effect on bank efficiency. Therefore, we develop 
the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4. Market-oriented disclosure and monitoring are positively related to cost 
efficiency.   
 
2.2.3 Ownership and bank efficiency 
Haw et al. (2010) argue that agency problems can be severe in the banking sector partly 
because of concentrated shareholding, which leads to connected lending and relationship 
banking, leading to lower bank efficiency. Nevertheless, agency theory suggests that ownership 
concentration enhances cash-flow ownership of controlling shareholders and reduces agency 
costs (see La Porta et al. 2002), which in turn improves bank efficiency. In support of this 
argument, Iannotta et al. (2007) find that ownership concentration is associated with better loan 
quality and lower asset risk. Shehzad et al. (2010) also find that ownership concentration 
significantly reduces bank risk at low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory 
control. Since the quality of investor protection and bank regulation is relatively weak in the 
MENA region (Rocha et al. 2011), and ownership is concentrated as a response to poor legal 
protection of investors (Omran et al. 2008), we expect a positive effect of ownership 
concentration. Following this, we intend to test the following hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 5. Ownership concentration is positively related to the cost efficiency of a bank. 
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A related literature suggests that government ownership of banks might be justified from the 
perspective of social welfare arguments and the need to address monopoly power and 
distributional concerns (Shleifer et al. 1997). Whilst Otchere (2005) argues that government 
ownership in the financial sector is beneficial in countries with underdeveloped institutions, 
Haw et al. (2010) find that government control is subject to greater agency conflicts in 
countries with weak legal and regulatory institutions. Likewise government ownership brings 
inefficiency because of conflicts between social objectives and political interests, bureaucracy 
and corruption, and interest group politics (Shleifer et al. 1997). Based on these observations, 
together with the dominance of government-controlled banks in the region, we expect 
government ownership is likely to reduce bank efficiency in the MENA region.   
 
Foreign banks face liabilities of foreignness, which includes additional operating costs in 
overseas markets, and the difficulties in adopting host country norms and practices (Kobeissi et 
al. 2010). These additional costs related to liabilities of foreignness can lead to lower bank 
efficiency. However, the ‘global advantage hypothesis’ suggests that foreign banks might 
benefit from more advanced technologies, highly skilled labor force and better risk 
management practices (Lensink et al. 2008). This can assist foreign banks to exploit bank-
specific advantages and to overcome the liabilities of foreignness in less competitive host 
countries (Kobeissi et al. 2010), leading to an improved bank efficiency. Foreign banks often 
outperform domestic banks in terms of profitability, cost efficiency and competitiveness in 
developing and emerging economies (Micco et al. 2007). Considering the ’global advantage 
hypothesis’, together with the institutional similarity between the emerging and MENA 
countries, foreign ownership is predicted to have a positive effect on bank efficiency. 
Therefore, we intend to test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6.  Government ownership exerts a negative influence, whereas foreign ownership 
exerts a positive influence on the cost efficiency of a bank. 
 
2.2.4 Interaction effects of bank regulation and ownership on bank efficiency  
The regulatory environment characterizes how a bank is capable of acting within an economy 
(Barth et al. 2001b). Whilst some studies (e.g., Laeven et al. 2009) posit that the effect of bank 
regulation depends critically on each bank’s ownership structure, others (e.g., Haw et al. 2010; 
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Shehzad et al. 2010) argue that bank regulation might constrain the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms such as ownership concentration. Understanding how specific regulatory and 
supervisory practices affect bank performance is important. In the MENA region this is further 
complicated with the bank dominated financial systems, concentrated banking markets and 
continued government ownership of banks. The Basel regulation does not depend on bank 
ownership characteristics, so we therefore test: 
 
Hypothesis 7: The effect of bank ownership on cost efficiency depends on bank regulation, and 
vice versa.   
 
 
3. Empirical specifications and data 
 
We use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate cost efficiency, and then apply one-step 
maximum likelihood estimations to examine the impact of ownership and bank regulation on 
bank efficiency. Charnes et al. (1978) introduced the DEA method and Banker et al. (1984) 
extended this method to include variable returns to scale (VRS). This method solves linear 
programming problems to construct production possibilities of a decision-making unit (DMU) 
such as a bank, based on the envelopment of multiple input and output variables. Barth et al. 
(2013) observe that, unlike the parametric technique (such as stochastic frontier analysis), a 
nonparametric DEA-based efficiency measure is not dependent on the misspecification of the 
functional form. Banker et al. (2008) also find that DEA-based estimation is superior to 
parametric techniques in estimating the efficiency of a decision making unit (DMU).   
 
We follow Zhu (2009) in using the following variable returns to scale DEA models of cost 
efficiency. Suppose the sample is n and there are m inputs and s outputs for each bank. Denote 
    as a m×1 vector of inputs for bank k,     as a m×n matrix of inputs,     as a s×1 vector of 
outputs for bank k, and     as a s×n matrix of outputs, respectively. Under the linear 
programming based DEA model, the minimum cost of producing the target output can be 
expressed as: 
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The cost efficiency is then measured as  
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       (2) 
 
According to the DEA method, cost efficiency scores of a bank fall in between 0 and 1. A bank 
with an efficiency score of 1 indicates an efficient bank as it is located on the efficient frontier, 
whereas a score below 1 indicates relative inefficiency.  
   
Following Barth et al. (2013) we adopt an intermediation approach to estimate Equations (1) 
and (2) in terms of four inputs and three outputs. The input variables are: total funding (total 
deposits + total money market funding + total other funding) (x1), total fixed assets (x2), 
personnel expenses (x3) and loan loss provisions (x4). Whilst the input variables x1, x2 and x3 
are similar to those of many other studies, Barth et al. (2013) argue that loan loss provisions 
should be considered as an additional input in bank efficiency analysis, since it captures risks 
or potential costs of lending decisions given loan quality. This argument might also be relevant 
to MENA banking, where loan loss provisions tend to be quite high especially in the state-
owned banks (Farazi et al. 2011). The prices of four input variables are the ratio of interest 
expenses to total funding, the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets, the ratio of 
personnel expenses to total assets, and the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, 
respectively. The three output variables are: total loans (y1), total other earning assets (y2) 
other operating income (y3). The prices of the three output variables are the ratios of interest 
income to total loans, non-interest income to other earnings assets, and the ratio of other 
operating income to total assets, respectively. In addition, year dummies are included to 
account for technological changes.   
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In order to examine the effects of ownership and bank regulation, we follow Lensink et al. 
(2008), Pasiouras et al. (2009) and Gaganis et al. (2013) in using a one-step maximum 
likelihood approach (as proposed by Battese et al. 1995) with heteroskedasticity robust 
standards errors. The maximum likelihood approach provides a valid inference about the 
impact of firm-specific and country-specific attributes, whilst controlling for other cross-
country differences. Accordingly, we use both time and country dummies to account for 
technological differences over time as well as between countries. Whilst there might be a 
potential endogeneity problem due to reverse causality, Pasiouras et al. (2009, p.296) argue that 
the predicted (in)efficiencies are only a function of the environmental variables, and therefore 
the latter should be included in the first step to obtain unbiased estimators of the parameters. 
This makes the two-step method unnecessary. Nonetheless, to validate our results, we follow 
Barth et al. (2013) and Chortareas et al. (2013) in using a second-stage truncated regression 
estimation based on bootstrapping procedure, as proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). The 
evidence from these studies suggests that causality runs from bank regulations to bank 
efficiency, rather than the other way around. Using cost efficiency scores as the dependent 
variable, the following regression model is estimated: 
 
                                                   
                                                             
                                                              
                      (3) 
 
       is the efficiency score for bank k at time t obtained from the DEA model. The first five 
explanatory variables are the proxies for bank regulation such as, capital stringency (CS), 
supervisory power (SP), activity restrictions (AR), market discipline (MD) and deposit 
insurance (DI), whilst the following three variables indicate ownership structure namely, 
ownership concentration (OwnCon), government ownership and foreign ownership.        
is the interaction term for ownership (concentration, government or foreign) and regulation 
(capital stringency, supervisory power, activity restrictions or market discipline). We expect 
capital stringency, official supervisory power, and market discipline having positive 
14 
 
associations, whereas activity restrictions having a negative association with bank efficiency. 
In addition, ownership concentration and foreign ownership are expected to have positive 
influence, and government ownership is likely to have a negative influence on bank efficiency. 
For the interaction results we expect that the regulation may differ for different ownership 
types, to the main results.  
 
This model also includes a bank-level estimate of market power (MP) (measured by the Lerner 
index) to control for competition. We follow Agoraki et al. (2011) and Turk-Ariss (2010a) in 
computing the Lerner index (see Appendix A). Based on the theoretical prediction of 
competition-stability’ hypothesis (see Turk-Ariss, 2010b), market power is expected to have a 
negative association with bank efficiency. In order to control for other bank- and country-
specific determinants of bank efficiency, we follow among others, Barth et al. (2013) and 
Gaganis et al. (2013), in using bank size, equity (EQ), deposit, lending, loan growth, natural 
logarithm of real GDP per capita (income), GDP growth, real rate of interest and year dummies 
as control variables. Finally, country dummies are included to confirm that the results are not 
influenced by the differences across countries. Table 1 provides a detailed description of the 
variables. 
 
As part of our effort to test Hypothesis 7, we also incorporate the interaction of each of the four 
bank regulation variables (e.g., CS, SP, AR, and MD) with three ownership variables (e.g, 
ownership concentration, government and foreign ownership) in our estimation of Eq.(3). In 
doing this, we follow Agoraki et al. (2011) in reducing multicollinearity problem by ‘centring’ 
the variables. This is done by subtracting the mean from each observation, prior to 
incorporating them into the specifications. In order to measure the impact of the global 
financial crisis (GFC), we also estimate Eq.(3) with the post-GFC dummy as an additional test 
variable. In addition, we estimate Eq.(3) for the sub-samples of pre- and post-GFC periods. 
 
 
 
3.1 Sample and data: 
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Due to availability of data, we use an unbalanced panel dataset covering 718 observations from 
132 commercial banks based in 12 MENA countries, including six GCC countries (such as 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) and six non-GCC 
countries (such as Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria). This study uses 
country-specific and bank-level data over a period of 11 years (2002-2012). The ownership and 
financial data are collected from the Bankscope database provided by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van 
Dijk, together with the annual reports and websites of the banks.  
 
In addition, we use the World Bank database on bank regulation and supervision (Barth et al., 
2001a, 2004, 2008) and the World Bank’s bank regulation survey (2011)  to construct indices 
relating to capital stringency, restrictions on bank activities, supervisory power and market 
discipline. Agoraki et al. (2011) argue that these indices can be more informative than dummy 
variables to construct a more harmonized measure. Since the World Bank datasets cover 
several points in time, the 2001-dataset is used for bank observations of 2001-2003, the 2004-
dataset for bank observations over 2004-2007, the 2008-dataset for bank observations over 
2008-2010, and the 2011-dataset for bank observations over 2011-2012. Moreover, the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), IMF’s International Financial Statistics, OECD 
survey on corporate governance in MENA countries, annual reports of the central banks, are 
consulted to collect macroeconomic data.  
 
Table 2 shows a highly concentrated ownership structure in MENA banking, with the mean 
value of highest shareholding being 47% (Panel A), whilst for specific countries with the more 
concentrated ownership are Algeria and Egypt at 75% and 71% respectively. Jordan Kuwait 
and Oman have less concentrated ownership. Capital stringency tends to be good in most 
countries, with the lowest level in Egypt. Saudi Arabia has the most activity restrictions with 
Qatar the least. Supervisory power is fairly strong in most countries, but less so for Jordan and 
Kuwait. For market discipline the mean is quite high for the sample indicating incentives to 
disclose to the market. On a country basis Algeria and Oman have the lowest levels of market 
discipline.  
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Table 2 also shows that foreign investors own around 28% shares among the sample banks, 
whilst overall government ownership is around 15%. In addition, the mean value of the Lerner 
index is 0.51, indicating the presence of monopolistic competition in MENA banking, and thus 
supporting the evidence of Turk-Ariss (2010a). Banks in Syria and Algeria have a high level of 
liquid assets and banks in Syria a high market power. Equity levels are generally quite high in 
the region with Morocco though reporting 8%. Funding by deposits is very high for Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Lebanon and the highest GDP growth in Qatar. The higher results for 
liquidity and capital for Egyptian and Syrian banks could relate to the Arab Spring uprising 
which began in 2010 and also the war in Syria from 2011.  
 
 
4. Empirical results and analysis 
4.1 Estimates of efficiency: 
 
Table 3 shows country-wise distribution of cost and profit efficiency scores of MENA banks. 
The mean score of cost efficiency of the entire sample is 0.38, suggesting that the degree of 
cost inefficiency is quite low in the MENA banking sector. The table reveals that banks in 
Algeria, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. and Qatar have greater cost efficiency scores than other MENA 
countries, with the efficiency scores ranging from 0.47 to 0.63. Overall, cost efficiency are 
lowest amongst banks in Lebanon, Egypt and Syria which could relate to the political issues in 
these countries. The estimates of cost scores are comparatively lower than those of Olson et al. 
(2011), who provide an assessment of cost and profit efficiency of banks in MENA countries. 
The profit efficiency average is 43% which is also low with specifically Egypt, Syria and 
Lebanon with low results which of course could be related to the political issues in these 
countries. The efficiency scores are also lower than the estimates of Sassi (2013), who assesses 
technical efficiency of non-GCC banks. One possible reason for this difference is that we use 
loan loss provisions and other operating income as an additional input and output variable, 
respectively. 
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4.2 Public and private view of bank regulation:  
 
First we consider the results in regards to the public view of bank regulation, that more specific 
regulation is good for the efficiency performance of banks (Barth et al. 2013). Table 4 shows 
estimation results of cost efficiency based on a one-step maximum likelihood estimations with 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Table 5 reports the cost efficiency scores with the 
same estimation technique but also reported for the pre-GFC and post-GFC time periods based 
on frontier regressions and truncated regressions. Table 6 reports the second-stage truncated 
maximum likelihood regression results for cost efficiency, with Tables 7 and 8 reporting the 
frontier regression results pre- and post-GFC, respectively. 
 
 
 
Results for capital stringency appear to have a positive influence on cost efficiency for the full 
sample period tested in Tables 4-6, but in the pre-global crisis period only Model 3 in Table 7 
is positive. For the post-global crisis results in Table 8 the results are all positive, indicating an 
improvement in the ability of capital regulation to promote efficiency since the implementation 
of the Basel regulations. These results support Hypothesis 1 and the findings of Chortareas et 
al. (2012) and Barth et al. (2013) that capital stringency supports bank cost efficiency. 
 
Also in support of the public view that bank regulation is good for bank efficiency, supervisory 
power has a positive relationship with cost efficiency results for the full sample period (Tables 
4 – 6). Similar to capital stringency results though, in the pre-crisis period this particular 
regulatory measure was not significant (Table 7) but in the post crisis period was significant in 
Models 1, 4, 5 and 6. This again suggests positive effects from the Basel regulation and 
supports Hypothesis 2, other than in the pre-crisis period that bank supervisors are able to 
promote efficient banks in the MENA region. Models 1 and 4 of Table 5 further show post 
GFC dummy having significant positive effect on cost efficiency, indicating a positive effect of 
the implementation of the Basel regulations after the financial crisis. Particularly in the post 
crisis period we do not find evidence therefore for the political/regulatory capture hypothesis in 
regards to cost efficiency.   
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The results for activity restrictions by regulators often report a significantly negative result 
(Tables 4-6) supporting Hypothesis 3 that higher restrictions lead to a lower cost efficiency, 
reinforcing the findings of Barth et al. (2013) and Chortareas et al. (2012). This is consistent 
with the arguments of the ‘private view’ of bank regulation. The crisis sample results though 
are only significant in Models 5 and 6 of Table 8 for the post crisis period where interaction 
terms for ownership and supervisory power and ownership and activity restrictions are 
included. Therefore we find support for Hypothesis 3 except in the pre-GFC period.  
 
Next we consider the private view of bank regulation that effective market disclosure can 
positively lead to bank monitoring and efficient operations. The results were not as expected 
with some significantly negative results in Tables 4-6. In the pre-GFC period no significant 
results are reported and in the post GFC period some negative results are found. This suggests 
that in the MENA region that public disclosure is not an adequate means to support bank 
efficiency. Hypothesis 4 is not supported. Therefore we suggest that regulators should focus on 
bank regulation and supervision to promote cost efficient banks in the MENA region. 
 
Deposit insurance tends to have a negative impact on cost efficiency (Tables 4-6) and in the 
post-crisis period (Table 8), a finding that is consistent with Barth et al. (2013). This may 
suggest some moral hazard issues where insured depositors are not motivated to monitor banks, 
resulting in excessive risk-taking and reduced efficiency of a bank. This result was not 
expected, given deposit insurance aims to make pay-outs to depositors in the case of bank 
failure more efficient, but may be due to the fact that many countries in the MENA region do 
not have deposit insurance.  
 
 
4.3  Bank ownership and bank efficiency: 
 
Given that bank regulation and in particular the Basel regulation does not differentiate on bank 
ownership type, then we test if this is important in regards to the efficiency of banks in the 
MENA region. We had hypothesized that ownership concentration would have a positive 
influence on bank cost efficiency given the limited investor protection in the region and more 
concentrated markets, and the results in Tables 4-6 tend to support this view. The results for the 
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pre-crisis period in Table 7 are not as strong as for the post-crisis sample in Table 8. Therefore, 
even though the IMF (2008) expresses concerns about the dominance of a concentrated 
banking sector and a low transfer of ownership in the MENA region, our findings suggest that 
ownership concentration does not seem to impede cost efficiency. We therefore find support 
for Hypothesis 5. 
 
We expected that government ownership would lead to a lower cost efficiency due to conflicts 
with social and political objectives (Shleifer et al. 1997). Our results though tend to support the 
view of Otchere (2005) that government ownership is beneficial as in this case the cost 
efficiency results are usually positive (Tables 4-6). In the pre-GFC period results of Table 7 the 
results were positive, but not so for the post-GFC period (Table 8). This again suggests further 
potential benefits with the implementation of the Basel regulation and in the follow up period 
to the global crisis. Foreign bank ownership tended not to be significant in regards to cost 
efficiency, therefore not supporting the global advantage hypothesis in the MENA region. 
Overall we find some evidence against Hypothesis 6 in regards to government banks being 
inefficient in the MENA region, except for the post-GFC period. This suggests that whilst the 
supporting markets and infrastructure in the MENA region are in the developmental stage, 
regulators should not push to privatize government owned banks and that foreign banks may 
not find an advantage in these markets. Foreign banks in the MENA region therefore appear to 
face a liability of foreignness which was outlined by Kobeissi et al. (2010). 
 
This evidence tends to contradict a widely-held notion that government control causes greater 
agency conflicts. Whilst this evidence supports Pasiouras et al. (2009), it contradicts Barth et 
al. (2013) and Chortareas et al. (2012), who find government ownership having an inverse 
effect on bank efficiency. Farazi et al. (2011) and Kobeissi et al. (2010) also argue that 
government ownership causes greater political interventions in credit allocations, higher costs, 
larger loan loss provisions and poor risk management in MENA countries. One possible 
interpretation is that a strong government influence, together with substantial entry barriers, 
may cause government banks to enjoy some competitive advantage over foreign-controlled 
banks in MENA countries (see for instance, Ayadi et al. 2013).  
 
 
20 
 
4.4 Interaction of bank regulation and ownership on cost efficiency: 
 
The interaction results of ownership concentration and supervisory power maintain a positive 
association with cost efficiency for the full sample as well the post-crisis period, suggesting an 
inter-dependence between internal and external governance mechanisms. This evidence is 
partly in line the Hypothesis 7, and supports the arguments of related literature such as Laeven 
et al. (2009) and Shehzad et al. (2010). For government ownership we find a negative result of 
government ownership and supervisory power on cost efficiency in the pre-crisis period 
(Models 2 and 6, Table 7) and once in Model 6, Table 4 for the full sample period. This 
suggests that a higher supervisory power has a negative impact on government banks, 
particularly in the pre-crisis period. This does not hold for the post-crisis sample in Table 8 
suggesting some improvement. In Table 4 we find a positive relationship between government 
ownership and activity restriction but the individual results for government ownership was 
positive, whilst activity restriction had some negative results. This result was not supported in 
Table 6 or the pre/post-crisis samples.   
 
The interaction results for foreign banks are interesting. We find that in Models 4 and 5 of 
Tables 4 and 6, that the interaction of foreign bank ownership and capital stringency has a 
negative effect on cost efficiency. The same effect is supported in the pre-crisis period of 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 7, but does not hold for the post-crisis sample (Table 8), again 
suggesting improvement in regulation. For the interaction of foreign bank ownership and 
supervisory power we find a negative relationship in Models 6 of Tables 4 and 6, and in Model 
6 of the post-crisis sample in Table 8. Unlike our other results which often tend to report an 
improvement with the onset of the Basel regulation and post crisis period, the interaction of 
foreign bank and supervisory power result suggests that regulators in the MENA region should 
consider the effects on foreign banks, although our results are not consistent where all bank 
regulation and foreign bank interactions are included.  
 
Interestingly, the bank level estimate of market power (i.e. the Lerner index) shows a 
statistically significant positive association with cost efficiency (Tables 4-8). This evidence 
contradicts Barth et al. (2013) and Chortareas et al. (2012), who find lower competition (as 
measured by HHI) being inversely associated with bank efficiency. In a study on developing 
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economies, Turk-Ariss (2010b) find market power of a bank having a positive association with 
profit efficiency, amid insignificant relationship with cost efficiency. This result supports the 
argument that powerful banks in more concentrated markets (such as the MENA region) can 
exploit the benefits of imperfect competition by setting higher lending rates and lower deposit 
rates (see Pasiouras et al. 2009). Overall, this result appears to contradict ‘competition-
stability’ hypothesis, and supports the arguments that a bank with higher market power may 
reduce information asymmetry problem, improve loan quality portfolio and enhance bank 
stability (see Turk-Ariss, 2010a). Among the other control variables, loan growth and bank 
lending show positive associations with cost efficiency, whereas bank size, interest rate and 
GDP per capita are inversely related to cost efficiency often in the full samples and the pre-
GFC sample (Table 7). But in the post-crisis sample of Tables 5 and 8, lending and interest 
rates were less significant.    
 
 
4.5 Profit efficiency results:  
 
Although not the main focus of this paper we did consider profit efficiency using the same 
inputs and outputs as per the cost efficiency analysis. Frontier regression results are reported in 
Table 9 and it can be seen that for many of the variables, the results are not significant. Some 
slight negative results are obtained for foreign banks on profit efficiency, and for deposit 
insurance. In regards to bank controls, market power, bank size and loan growth had positive 
effects whilst, lending had a negative effect on profit efficiency. For the interaction results, 
government ownership and market discipline led to a positive effect on profit efficiency, whilst 
foreign ownership and market discipline led to a negative result. In Table 10 the post-GFC 
dummy suggests a negative impact. In the pre-GFC period (Model 2, Table 10) ownership 
concentration had a positive effect and foreign ownership a negative effect on profit efficiency 
but these did not continue in the post-GFC period (Model 3, Table 10).  
 
 
 
 
4.6 Robustness tests and further investigation: 
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We undertake a robustness test with estimates of Equation (3) using a one-side censored Tobit 
model in order to allow for a restricted range (between 0 and 1) of efficiency values. The 
estimation results are not reported but available on request. Although the focus of our paper is 
different, we examine if the Arab Spring had an impact on bank efficiency in MENA countries. 
We look into the estimation results (not reported) of each of the country dummies that are used 
in every specification. We find that the country dummies for Egypt and Syria show statistically 
significant negative associations with cost efficiency for the whole sample period as well the 
post-crisis period, indicating some support for an inverse effect of the Arab Spring bank 
efficiency in countries such as Egypt and Syria. This evidence supports Ghosh (2016) that 
shows the Arab Spring having an inverse effect on bank profitability and a positive effect on 
bank risk in the MENA region. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study examined how ownership and bank regulation individually and interactively 
influence bank efficiency in the context of 132 commercial banks from 12 MENA countries. 
The cost efficiency results supported the public view, rather than private view of bank 
regulation, meaning that in the MENA region bank regulation aids in the efficient allocation of 
resources better than bank disclosure where the market may discipline banks (i.e. the private 
view of bank regulation).  
 
Bank regulation results had positive effects on cost efficiency in the post global crisis period 
and full sample period, suggesting improvements in the post-crisis period which also saw the 
implementation of the Basel framework. For specific bank regulation type effects on efficiency 
we find that capital regulation had a positive effect on cost efficiency, but not in the pre-global 
crisis period. In a similar fashion, official supervisory power had a positive influence on cost 
efficiency, but again not in the pre-global crisis period. Also with bank regulation that restricts 
activities of banks had the expected negative influence on cost efficiency, but not in the pre-
global crisis period.  
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In regards to ownership, we find some influence on bank efficiency. Ownership concentration 
is positively related to cost efficiency, but for profit efficiency only in the pre-global crisis 
period. Surprisingly, government ownership of banks had a positive influence on cost 
efficiency, but not in the post-crisis period, and not for profit efficiency. Foreign banks 
appeared to not have any advantage in the MENA region which does not support the global 
advantage hypothesis. Interestingly, the bank-level estimate of market power (a control 
variable) shows a positive association with cost and profit efficiency, indicating that imperfect 
competition in the concentrated MENA banking market does not seem to impede bank 
efficiency.  
 
The interaction results of ownership concentration and supervisory power seem to indicate an 
interdependence between internal (e.g., ownership concentration) and external governance 
mechanisms (supervisory power). The interaction results between bank ownership type and 
bank regulation resulted in some interesting findings particularly for government owned and 
foreign banks. For government owned banks, the interaction of government ownership and 
supervisory power had a negative influence on cost efficiency in the pre-global crisis period 
but not significant post-crisis. This was not expected as individually these characteristics had a 
positive influence, but the results suggest improvement in the post-crisis period. The 
interaction of foreign bank ownership and regulatory capital stringency had a negative effect on 
cost efficiency in the full sample and pre-global crisis periods, but appear not significant and 
therefore to improve in the post-crisis period, suggesting some improvement in bank 
efficiency.    
 
Overall the findings were not fully consistent with other MENA banking study findings, 
although our focus was slightly different. For instance, the stronger performance of 
government banks in the MENA region, although using different measures, does not support 
the findings of Farazi et al. (2013). One notable aspect of our evidence is that we find 
inconclusive evidence in regards to the effects of ownership and bank regulation on profit 
efficiency of a bank. Our results suggested that cost efficiency was explained with ownership 
and regulatory variables more so than profit efficiency, whereas Olson and Zoubi (2011) 
suggested that in regards to bank efficiency and profitability, that profit efficiency was more 
important in the MENA region.  
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Appendix A: The process of calculating the Lerner Index: 
 
Lerner Index,      
        
    
, where Pit is the price of bank production measured the ratio of 
total revenues (interest and non-interest income) to total assets for bank i at time t, and MCit is 
the marginal cost for bank i at time t. Marginal cost is based on following translog cost 
function with one output (Q) and three input prices (W1, W2 and W3): 
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where Q = Total assets  
w1 = price of labour (the ratio of personal expenses to total assets) 
w2 = price of physical capital (the ratio of non-interest expenses to fixed assets) 
w3 = price of borrowed funds (the ratio of paid interest to total funding) 
 
The marginal cost is derived as: 
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           ]                                                          (    )  
 
Equation (A.1) is estimated using fixed effect model for the whole panel of banks, since some 
countries have small sample size (see also Agoraki et al. 2011), and thus provided statistically 
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insignificant results. The Lerner index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no market power of 
the bank (perfect competition) and 1 indicating the monopoly condition, where banks charge 
higher mark-up price over marginal cost (e.g., higher market power of the bank. 
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Table 1 Variable definitions. 
Panel A: Financial intermediation model 
Output variables  
y1 Total loans (millions USD) 
y2 Other earnings assets (millions USD) 
y2 Other operating income (millions USD) 
Output prices: 
 
q1 The ratio of interest income to total loans 
q2 The ratio of non-interest income to other earnings assets  
q2 The ratio of other operating income to total assets  
Input variables: 
 
x1 Total funding (total deposits + total money market funding + other funding) (millions 
USD) 
x2 Fixed assets (millions USD) 
x3 Loan loss provisions (millions USD) 
x4 Personnel expenses (millions USD) 
Input prices: 
 
p1 The ratio of interest expenses total funding 
p2 The ratio of non-interest expenses fixed assets  
p3 The ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
p4 Personnel expenses to total assets  
Equity The ratio of total equity to total assets 
 
Panel B: Determinants of bank efficiency 
Capital stringency 
index (CS) 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1–6 and 0 
otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the case of questions 7 and 8 (i.e. yes = 0, no = 1). 
(1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basel 
guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with market risk? (3–5) Before minimum capital 
adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value of 
capital: (a) market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? (b) Unrealized 
losses in securities portfolios? (c) Unrealized foreign exchange losses? (6) Are the 
sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
(7) Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash 
or government securities? (8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed 
funds? 
 
Supervisory power 
index (SP) 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one 
of the following questions: (1) does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with 
external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? (2) Are auditors 
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider 
abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? (4) 
Can the supervisory authorities force a bank to change its internal organizational 
structure? (5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the 
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supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to constitute provisions to 
cover actual or potential losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s 
decision to distribute dividends? (8) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s 
decision to distribute bonuses? (9) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s 
decision to distribute management fees? (10) Can the supervisory agency supersede bank 
shareholder rights and declare bank insolvent? (11) Does banking law allow supervisory 
agency or any other government agency (other than court) to suspend some or all 
ownership rights of a problem bank? (12) Regarding bank restructuring and 
reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than 
court) supersede shareholder rights? (13) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, 
can supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than court) remove and 
replace management? (14) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can 
supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than court) remove and 
replace directors? 
 
Activity restrictions 
index (AR) 
The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory 
restrictiveness for bank participation in: (1) securities activities (2) insurance activities (3) 
real estate activities (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. These activities can be 
unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited that are assigned the values of 1–4, 
respectively. We use an overall index by calculating the average value over the four 
categories. Higher values indicate more restrictions. 
 
Market discipline 
index (MD) 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1–7 and 0 
otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the case of questions 8 (i.e. yes = 0, no = 1). (1) Is 
subordinated debt allowable (or required) as part of capital? (2) Are financial institutions 
required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial 
subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to public? (4) Must banks disclose 
their risk management procedures to public? (5) Are directors legally liable for 
erroneous/misleading information? (6) Does regulation require credit ratings for 
commercial banks? (7) Is an external audit by certified/licensed auditor a compulsory 
obligation for banks? (8) Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enters the 
income statement while loan is non-performing? Higher values indicate more incentive to 
disclose to the market. 
 
Deposit insurance A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country has deposit insurance, and zero 
otherwise. 
Own. concentration The ownership percentage held by the largest shareholder 
Govt. ownership Proportion of equity held by the government 
Foreign ownership Proportion of equity held by foreign investors 
Market power The Lerner index (see Appendix A) 
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD 
Deposits The ratio of deposits to total assets 
Loan growth % change in the amount of bank i’s total customer loans from the year t-1 to year t. 
Lending The ratio of total loans to total assets  
Interest rate Real interest rate (%) 
Income level Natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the country.  
Post-GFC A dummy variable that equals 1 for the years 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. 
GDP Growth The growth rate of real GDP (constant 2000 prices) 
Year Dummies Dummy variable for each of the twelve years  
Note: We follow among others Agoraki et al. (2011) in constructing the indices of CS (capital stringency), SP 
(supervisory power), AR (activity restrictions), and MD (market discipline). 
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Table 2 Summary statistics.  
 Panel A: Variable summary statistics 
 Mean Std Dev. Observations 
Capital stringency  6.96 1.27 718 
Supervisory power 12.62 1.69 718 
Activity restrictions 2.49 0.41 718 
Market discipline 6.91 0.86 718 
Ownership concentration 0.47 0.27 718 
Government ownership 0.15 0.24 718 
Foreign ownership 0.28 0.35 718 
Market power 0.51 0.11 718 
Equity / Total assets 0.13 0.23 718 
Total deposits / Total assets 0.70 0.14 717 
Loan growth 17.75 23.13 716 
Total loans / Total assets  0.51 0.18 718 
Interest income / Total loan 0.12 0.12 718 
Non-interest income / Other earnings assets 0.07 0.22 718 
Other operating income / Total assets  0.00 0.01 718 
Interest expenses / Total deposits  0.03 0.02 718 
Loan loss provisions / Total loans 0.02 0.11 718 
Non-interest expenses / Fixed assets 1.56 1.08 718 
Personnel expenses / Total assets  0.01 0.00 718 
GDP growth 0.05 0.04 718 
Inflation rate 0.08 0.09 718 
Interest rate 0.01 0.10 718 
 
 
Table 2 (continued) Summary statistics. 
Panel B: Summary statistics across countries 
 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi 
Arabia 
Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Oman Qatar Syria UAE 
Capital 
stringency  
6.17 7.38 4.65 7.40 5.54 7.67 7.64 5.73 6.91 5.56 5.28 7.63 
Supervisory 
power 
13.00 13.5 13.37 10.53 13.5 10.8 12.8 12.5 13.13 11.16 13.26 13.22 
Activity 
restrictions 
2.27 2.35 2.62 2.70 2.89 2.04 2.64 2.89 2.89 1.86 2.72 2.15 
Market 
discipline 
5.54 7.00 7.61 6.53 7.00 7.57 6.13 6.95 5.98 6.92 7.00 8.00 
Own. 
concentration 
0.75 0.38 0.71 0.30 0.39 0.33 0.59 0.63 0.29 0.40 0.46 0.47 
Govt. 
ownership 
0.30 0.24 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.32 
Foreign own. 0.56 0.48 0.46 0.31 0.24 0.15 0.25 0.28 0.17 0.13 0.42 0.11 
Institutional 
own. 
0.08 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.03 
Bank 
ownership 
0.53 0.37 0.52 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.44 0.29 0.12 0.46 0.10 
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Liquid assets 0.45 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.20 0.31 0.36 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.52 0.24 
Market power 0.52 0.47 0.39 0.48 0.58 0.59 0.40 0.48 0.52 0.58 0.83 0.58 
Equity / Total 
assets 
0.20 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.17 
Deposit 0.53 0.47 0.79 0.69 0.74 0.59 0.81 0.65 0.71 0.64 0.70 0.65 
GDP growth 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.04 
 
 
  
 
Table 3 Country-wise distribution cost and profit efficiency scores. 
 Cost Efficiency Profit Efficiency  
Countries 
Mea
n 
Std 
Dev. 
95% C.I. 
Lower 
bound 
95% C.I. 
Upper 
bound 
Mea
n 
Std 
Dev. 
95% C.I. 
Lower 
bound 
95% C.I. 
Upper 
bound 
n 
Algeria 0.63 0.24 0.54 0.72 0.65 0.07 0.52 0.78 31 
Bahrain 0.42 0.21 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.04 0.31 0.46 55 
Egypt 0.18 0.06 0.17 0.20 0.30 0.05 0.20 0.40 40 
Jordan 0.34 0.12 0.31 0.36 0.28 0.02 0.24 0.32 71 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.52 0.22 0.47 0.57 0.68 0.03 0.62 0.73 83 
Kuwait 0.43 0.14 0.39 0.47 0.56 0.03 0.50 0.63 47 
Lebanon 0.19 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.02 0.19 0.26 160 
Morocco 0.42 0.20 0.33 0.52 0.38 0.06 0.25 0.51 20 
Oman 0.44 0.09 0.41 0.48 0.34 0.02 0.31 0.38 30 
Qatar 0.47 0.17 0.41 0.52 0.63 0.04 0.54 0.71 36 
Syria 0.31 0.06 0.28 0.34 0.29 0.06 0.17 0.41 21 
UAE 0.50 0.19 0.47 0.53 0.54 0.02 0.50 0.59 124 
All 0.38 0.21 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.01 0.41 0.45 718 
 
Table 4 Frontier regression results: Cost efficiency.  
 Panel A: Regulation and Ownership 
 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Cost Efficiency 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Capital 
stringency (CS) 
0.0213*** 0.0211*** 0.0216*** 0.0235*** 0.0229*** 0.0226*** 0.0217*** 0.0213*** 
(0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0076) 
Supervisory 
power (SP) 
0.0136*** 0.0179*** 0.0116*** 0.0124*** 0.0132*** 0.0178*** 0.0129*** 0.0136*** 
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Activity 
Restriction (AR) 
-0.0385* -0.0310 -0.0452** -0.0354* -0.0399** -0.0373* -0.0408* -0.0388* 
(0.0203) (0.0214) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0205) 
Market -0.0176* -0.0168 -0.0162 -0.0163 -0.0146 -0.0205** -0.0184* -0.0167 
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discipline (MD) (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0107) 
Deposit 
insurance (DI) 
-
0.0872*** 
-
0.0845*** 
-
0.0952*** 
-
0.0787*** 
-
0.0833*** 
-
0.0861*** 
-
0.0935*** 
-
0.0850*** 
(0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0284) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0280) 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
Ownership 
Concentration(O
C) 
0.114*** 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.0954*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.113*** 
(0.0229) (0.0250) (0.0228) (0.0233) (0.0255) (0.0229) (0.0231) (0.0230) 
Government 
ownership 
(Govt.) 
0.0599** 0.0631** 0.0641** 0.0708** 0.0856*** 0.0671** 0.0681** 0.0566* 
(0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0292) (0.0286) (0.0297) (0.0282) (0.0285) (0.0294) 
Foreign own. 
(Foreign) 
0.0049 0.0081 0.0056 0.0115 0.0212 0.0127 0.0004 0.0034 
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0199) (0.0187) (0.0179) (0.0192) (0.0180) 
B
an
k
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Market power 0.530*** 0.527*** 0.533*** 0.514*** 0.522*** 0.537*** 0.522*** 0.529*** 
(0.0463) (0.0467) (0.0462) (0.0471) (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0468) (0.0469) 
Bank size -0.0122** -0.0128** -0.0115** -0.0126** -0.0123** -0.0120** -0.0123** -0.0126** 
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Equity 0.0020 0.0047 0.0040 0.0035 0.0033 0.0127 0.0020 0.0025 
(0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0215) 
Deposit -0.0753 -0.0798 -0.0725 -0.0869* -0.0948* -0.0787 -0.0811 -0.0708 
(0.0501) (0.0501) (0.0503) (0.050) (0.0502) (0.0500) (0.0506) (0.0503) 
Loan growth 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Lending 0.123** 0.128*** 0.121** 0.110** 0.112** 0.134*** 0.127*** 0.115** 
(0.0490) (0.0491) (0.0494) (0.0493) (0.0489) (0.0488) (0.0490) (0.0499) 
M
ac
ro
 
Income level -0.124** -0.107** -0.121** -0.137*** -0.131** -0.121** -0.129** -0.123** 
(0.0517) (0.0524) (0.0516) (0.0519) (0.0515) (0.0514) (0.0519) (0.0521) 
GDP growth -0.0405 -0.0773 -0.0767 -0.0042 -0.0243 -0.0896 -0.0459 -0.0375 
(0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.169) (0.168) (0.170) (0.169) (0.169) 
Interest -0.217*** -0.200** -0.215*** -0.224*** -0.220*** -0.199** -0.214*** -0.217*** 
(0.0811) (0.0812) (0.0808) (0.0808) (0.0807) (0.0808) (0.0809) (0.0811) 
 
 
Table 4 (continued) Frontier regression results: Cost efficiency.  
Panel B: Interaction of ownership type and regulation  
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Cost Efficiency 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OC*CS  0.0149   0.0358**    
 (0.0160)   (0.0180)    
OC*SP  0.0256**    0.0465***   
 (0.0126)    (0.0153)   
OC*AR  0.0699     -0.0106  
 (0.0614)     (0.0657)  
OC*MD  0.0167      0.0042 
 (0.0263)      (0.0277) 
Govt.*CS   0.0038  -0.0344    
  (0.0192)  (0.0209)    
Govt.*SP   -0.0245   -0.0366**   
  (0.0171)   (0.0179)   
Govt.*AR   0.121**    0.118*  
  (0.0572)    (0.0607)  
Govt.*MD   0.0344     0.0193 
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  (0.0296)     (0.0323) 
Foreign*CS    -0.0306** -0.0448***    
   (0.0134) (0.0150)    
Foreign*SP    -0.0032  -0.0263**   
   (0.0094)  (0.0117)   
Foreign*AR    0.0031   0.0468  
   (0.0436)   (0.0454)  
Foreign*MD    -0.0280    -0.0108 
   (0.0226)    (0.0248) 
Constant 1.527**
* 
1.326*** 1.530*** 1.622*** 1.583*** 1.442*** 1.598*** 1.519*** 
(0.452) (0.462) (0.451) (0.457) (0.454) (0.450) (0.459) (0.457) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood 454.21 457.13 457.67 457.31 458.84 459.67 456.60 454.69 
LR tests (Wald χ2) 1150.75**
* 
1166.02*** 1168.89*** 1166.99*** 1175.06*** 1179.41*** 1163.26*** 1153.22*** 
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 
No. of banks 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
This table presents results based on stochastic frontier one-step maximum likelihood estimation technique. Dependent variable 
is cost efficiency score obtained from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model. CS, SP, AR, and MD are the indices of 
capital stringency, activity restrictions, supervisory power, and market discipline, respectively. Deposit insurance is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the country has deposit insurance, and zero otherwise. Ownership concentration (OC) is the 
percentage of ownership held by the largest shareholder. Government ownership (Govt.) is the proportion of equity held by the 
government. Foreign ownership (Foreign) is the proportion of equity held by foreign investors. Market power is the Lerner 
index (see Appendix A). Bank size is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. Deposits is the ratio of deposits 
to total assets. Loan growth is the percentage change in the amount of bank i’s total customer loans from the year t-1 to year t. 
Lending is the ratio of total loans to total assets. Interest rate is real interest rate. Income level is the natural logarithm of gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita of the country.  GDP Growth is the growth rate of real GDP (constant 2000 prices). Year 
Dummies are dummy variables for each of the twelve years. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are the heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
 
Table 5 Frontier and truncated regression results pre and post crisis: Cost efficiency. 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Cost Efficiency 
Frontier regressions Truncated regressions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
All  Pre-GFC Post-GFC All  Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Capital stringency (CS) 0.0213*** 0.0151 0.0259** 0.0213*** 0.0156 0.0282*** 
(0.0074) (0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0061) (0.0124) (0.0105) 
Supervisory power (SP) 0.0136*** 0.00674 0.00884* 0.0110*** 0.0029 0.0060 
(0.0038) (0.0098) (0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0096) (0.0047) 
Activity restrictions (AR) -0.0385* -0.0088 -0.0466* -0.0569*** -0.0442 -0.0566** 
(0.0203) (0.0693) (0.0244) (0.0170) (0.0678) (0.0227) 
Market discipline (MD) -0.0176* -0.0098 -0.0293 -0.0181** -0.0102 -0.0122 
(0.0103) (0.0150) (0.0185) (0.0070) (0.0150) (0.0176) 
Deposit insurance (DI) -0.0872*** 0.0690 -0.0928** -0.0764*** 0.0760 -0.0918*** 
(0.0279) (0.126) (0.0378) (0.0278) (0.140) (0.0354) 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
Own. concentration (OC) 0.114*** 0.0835*** 0.145*** 0.0830*** 0.0692** 0.117*** 
(0.0229) (0.0293) (0.0329) (0.0285) (0.0310) (0.0326) 
Government ownership 
(Govt.) 
0.0599** 0.0588 0.0319 0.0551* 0.0438 0.0310 
(0.0282) (0.0398) (0.0385) (0.0305) (0.0380) (0.0370) 
Foreign ownership 
(Foreign) 
0.0049 0.0087 0.0001 0.0222 0.0133 0.0142 
(0.0179) (0.0287) (0.0219) (0.0242) (0.0303) (0.0216) 
B a n k  s p e c i f i c  c o n t r o l s Market power 0.530*** 0.350*** 0.586*** 0.489*** 0.331*** 0.582*** 
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(0.0463) (0.0724) (0.0603) (0.0538) (0.0742) (0.0643) 
Bank size -0.0122** -0.0130* -0.00501 -0.0111* -0.0142* -0.00535 
(0.0049) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0072) (0.0068) 
Equity 0.0020 0.485*** 0.00319 -0.00124 0.287* 0.0009 
(0.0215) (0.156) (0.0222) (0.182) (0.166) (0.0223) 
Deposit -0.0753 -0.127* -0.0209 -0.0785 -0.112 -0.0530 
(0.0501) (0.0695) (0.0693) (0.0527) (0.0734) (0.0669) 
Loan growth 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Lending 0.123** 0.243*** 0.0212 0.203*** 0.216*** 0.153** 
(0.0490) (0.0756) (0.0658) (0.0611) (0.0786) (0.0653) 
M
ac
ro
  
Income level -0.124** -0.0336 -0.246** -0.0428 0.00331 -0.0926 
(0.0517) (0.0836) (0.100) (0.0377) (0.0829) (0.0671) 
GDP growth -0.0405 -0.528** 0.475* -0.0208 -0.530** 0.438* 
(0.169) (0.237) (0.265) (0.198) (0.245) (0.249) 
Interest -0.217*** -0.490** -0.157 -0.196** -0.518** -0.106 
(0.0811) (0.229) (0.0989) (0.0905) (0.232) (0.0895) 
 Post-GFC 0.287***   0.231***   
  (0.0321)   (0.0330)   
 Constant 1.240*** 0.415 2.516*** 0.596 0.287 1.063* 
  (0.435) (0.764) (0.864) (0.363) (0.790) (0.609) 
 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Log likelihood 454.21 255.00 251.24 546.76 274.05 311.14 
 LR tests (Wald χ2) 1150.75*** 562.11*** 786.61*** 4939.07*** 314.98*** 430.98*** 
 Observations 715 308 407 699 306 393 
Notes: Columns 1-3 of this table present results based on stochastic frontier one-step maximum likelihood estimation 
technique, whereas columns 4-6 present results based on second-stage truncated maximum likelihood estimation technique. 
See Table 4 for variable definitions. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The 
figures in parentheses are the heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
 
Table 6 Truncated regression results: Cost efficiency.  
 Panel A: Regulation and Ownership 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Cost Efficiency 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Capital stringency 
(CS) 
0.0213*** 0.0226*** 0.0217*** 0.0233*** 0.0233*** 0.0225*** 0.0217** 0.0219*** 
(0.0055) (0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0085) (0.0072) 
Supervisory power 
(SP) 
0.0110*** 0.0142*** 0.0099** 0.0099*** 0.0105*** 0.0162*** 0.0106*** 0.0108*** 
(0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038) 
Activity restrictions 
(AR) 
-0.0569*** -0.0549*** -0.0594** -0.0528*** -0.0578*** -0.0532*** -0.0606*** -0.0563*** 
(0.0215) (0.0200) (0.0235) (0.0185) (0.0202) (0.0206) (0.0230) (0.0216) 
Market discipline 
(MD) 
-0.0181*** -0.0195** -0.0181** -0.0169** -0.0152** -0.0212*** -0.0193** -0.0189** 
(0.0061) (0.0085) (0.0076) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0094) 
Deposit insurance 
(DI) 
-0.0764** -0.0760** -0.0783*** -0.0660** -0.0699*** -0.0765*** -0.0771** -0.0761** 
(0.0311) (0.0373) (0.0292) (0.0272) (0.0245) (0.0290) (0.0315) (0.0320) 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
Own. concentration 
(OC) 
0.0830*** 0.0830** 0.0839*** 0.0852*** 0.0683*** 0.0790** 0.0857*** 0.0819** 
(0.0287) (0.0331) (0.0299) (0.0276) (0.0244) (0.0325) (0.0300) (0.0335) 
Govt. ownership 
(Govt.) 
0.0551* 0.0569 0.0566* 0.0667* 0.0801*** 0.0612** 0.0597* 0.0542 
(0.0295) (0.0363) (0.0311) (0.0381) (0.0285) (0.0294) (0.0305) (0.0405) 
Foreign ownership 
(Foreign) 
0.0222 0.0252 0.0218 0.0303 0.0407** 0.0296 0.0161 0.0212 
(0.0180) (0.0228) (0.0251) (0.0220) (0.0187) (0.0232) (0.0209) (0.0266) 
B
an
k
 
sp
ec
if
ic
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 Market power 0.489*** 0.485*** 0.490*** 0.473*** 0.483*** 0.497*** 0.482*** 0.485*** 
(0.0680) (0.0673) (0.0557) (0.0499) (0.0677) (0.0605) (0.0637) (0.0683) 
Bank size -0.0111 -0.0115* -0.0107 -0.0114* -0.0116** -0.0109 -0.0119* -0.0108 
(0.0077) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0073) (0.0066) (0.0076) 
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Equity -0.0012 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 0.0099 -0.0010 -0.0010 
(0.195) (0.185) (0.159) (0.182) (0.203) (0.158) (0.174) (0.185) 
Deposit -0.0785 -0.0835 -0.0794 -0.0877 -0.0980* -0.0824 -0.0855 -0.0773 
(0.0609) (0.0703) (0.0608) (0.0601) (0.0518) (0.0654) (0.0610) (0.0534) 
Loan growth 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Lending 0.203*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.216*** 0.202*** 0.199*** 
(0.0677) (0.0658) (0.0494) (0.0538) (0.0507) (0.0614) (0.0514) (0.0549) 
M
ac
ro
  
Income level -0.0428 -0.0450 -0.0381 -0.0548 -0.0496 -0.0545 -0.0461 -0.0459 
(0.0473) (0.0433) (0.0481) (0.0483) (0.0478) (0.0451) (0.0559) (0.0462) 
GDP growth -0.0208 -0.0257 -0.0446 0.0218 -0.0021 -0.0458 -0.0256 -0.0139 
(0.162) (0.190) (0.133) (0.137) (0.163) (0.167) (0.125) (0.141) 
Interest -0.196*** -0.187** -0.197*** -0.201*** -0.198*** -0.178*** -0.197*** -0.198*** 
(0.0696) (0.0784) (0.0739) (0.0636) (0.0746) (0.0658) (0.0705) (0.0766) 
 
 
Table 6 (continued) Truncated regression results: Cost efficiency.  
Panel B: Interaction of ownership type and regulation  
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Cost Efficiency 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OC*CS  0.0052   0.0324*    
 (0.0154)   (0.0175)    
OC*SP  0.0252**    0.0503***   
 (0.0111)    (0.0155)   
OC*AR  0.0073     -0.0400  
 (0.0598)     (0.0731)  
OC*MD  -0.0080      -0.0089 
 (0.0314)      (0.0372) 
Govt*CS   0.00724  -0.0288    
  (0.0206)  (0.0230)    
Govt.*SP   -0.0136   -0.0314   
  (0.0203)   (0.0211)   
Govt.*AR   0.0564    0.0679  
  (0.0573)    (0.0655)  
Govt.*MD   0.0114     0.0089 
  (0.0382)     (0.0313) 
Foreign*CS    -0.0347*** -0.0494***    
   (0.0132) (0.0180)    
Foreign*SP    -0.0077  -0.0321***   
   (0.0098)  (0.0118)   
Foreign*AR    0.0087   0.0505  
   (0.0582)   (0.0496)  
Foreign*MD    -0.0214    -0.0061 
   (0.0227)    (0.0291) 
Constant 0.827* 0.808* 0.805* 0.911** 0.881** 0.844** 0.894* 0.855* 
(0.452) (0.426) (0.454) (0.427) (0.424) (0.398) (0.520) (0.452) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood 546.76 548.93 547.63 550.86 551.71 553.01 547.81 546.95 
LR tests (Wald χ2) 5259.08*** 6122.80*** 3890.17*** 4117.59*** 4459.26*** 5548.79*** 5203.35*** 3153.42*** 
Observations 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
No. of banks 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Notes: This table presents results based on second-stage truncated maximum likelihood estimation technique. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are the heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable is cost efficiency score obtained from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model. See Table 4 for variable definitions.  
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Table 7 Frontier regression results: Pre-global crisis (GFC). 
Dependent variable: Cost 
efficiency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
       
R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Capital stringency (CS) 0.0171 0.0086 0.0260** 0.0185 0.0197 0.0127 0.0124 
(0.0148) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0133) 
Supervisory power (SP) 0.0118 0.0107 0.0039 0.0068 0.0089 0.0118 0.0076 
(0.0104) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0098) 
Activity restriction (AR) -0.0143 0.0445 -0.0116 -0.0040 -0.0193 -0.00122 0.0102 
(0.0702) (0.0701) (0.0699) (0.0695) (0.0707) (0.0699) (0.0695) 
Market discipline (MD) -0.0106 -0.0119 -0.0077 -0.0061 -0.0117 -0.0086 -0.00758 
(0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0153) 
Deposit insurance (DI) 0.0780 0.152 0.0517 0.106 0.0660 0.0788 0.0709 
(0.131) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.129) (0.127) 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 Ownership conc. (OC) 0.0655 0.0953*** 0.0866*** 0.0576 0.0654** 0.0795*** 0.0934*** 
(0.0400) (0.0292) (0.0296) (0.0384) (0.0311) (0.0294) (0.0300) 
Government own. (Govt.) 0.0523 0.0609 0.0997** 0.104** 0.0661 0.0654* 0.0722* 
(0.0403) (0.0498) (0.0412) (0.0449) (0.0506) (0.0392) (0.0409) 
Foreign own. (Foreign) 0.0155 -0.0025 0.0422 0.0618* 0.0138 0.0109 -0.0031 
(0.0295) (0.0287) (0.0360) (0.0367) (0.0291) (0.0287) (0.0305) 
B
an
k
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 
Market power 0.349*** 0.365*** 0.320*** 0.344*** 0.355*** 0.368*** 0.317*** 
 (0.0730) (0.0715) (0.0758) (0.0716) (0.0735) (0.0720) (0.0758) 
Bank size -0.0142** -0.0132** -0.0136** -0.0131* -0.0132* -0.0128* -0.0165** 
 (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0069) 
Equity 0.528*** 0.527*** 0.564*** 0.551*** 0.529*** 0.489*** 0.532*** 
 (0.157) (0.153) (0.156) (0.155) (0.158) (0.155) (0.157) 
Deposits -0.122* -0.140** -0.116* -0.124* -0.114 -0.142** -0.132* 
 (0.0695) (0.0700) (0.0690) (0.0685) (0.0700) (0.0686) (0.0702) 
Loan growth 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Lending 0.255*** 0.202*** 0.217*** 0.225*** 0.264*** 0.233*** 0.223*** 
 (0.0763) (0.0768) (0.0773) (0.0755) (0.0762) (0.0759) (0.0782) 
M
ac
ro
 
Income level -0.0458 -0.0342 -0.0381 -0.0324 -0.0558 -0.0303 -0.0315 
(0.0843) (0.0823) (0.0824) (0.0826) (0.0842) (0.0826) (0.0833) 
GDP growth -0.507** -0.625*** -0.453* -0.493** -0.475** -0.615*** -0.527** 
 (0.237) (0.234) (0.236) (0.234) (0.238) (0.235) (0.235) 
Interest -0.512** -0.519** -0.559** -0.539** -0.523** -0.486** -0.484** 
 (0.231) (0.226) (0.227) (0.227) (0.229) (0.227) (0.228) 
 OC*CS 0.00871   0.0336    
  (0.0254)   (0.0278)    
 OC*SP 0.00994     0.0406  
  (0.0204)     (0.0284)  
 OC*AR -0.129    -0.160   
  (0.101)    (0.0988)   
 OC*MD 0.0143      0.0555* 
  (0.0341)      (0.0330) 
 Govt.*CS  0.0715*  -0.00935    
   (0.0385)  (0.0306)    
 Govt.*SP  -0.0821***    -0.105***  
  (0.0305)    (0.0323)  
 Govt.*AR  0.0268   0.0505   
   (0.0964)   (0.106)   
 Govt.*MD  -0.0511     -0.0239 
   (0.0547)     (0.0369) 
 Foreign*CS   -0.0623*** -0.0709***    
    (0.0217) (0.0259)    
 Foreign*SP 
 
  0.00643   -0.0356  
   (0.0162)   (0.0240)  
 Foreign*AR   -0.0887  -0.0195   
    (0.0800)  (0.0883)   
 Foreign*MD   -0.0369    -0.0566 
    (0.0329)    (0.0351) 
 Constant 0.452 0.256 0.411 0.305 0.551 0.310 0.408 
(0.767) (0.756) (0.753) (0.757) (0.765) (0.758) (0.762) 
 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Log likelihood 256.89 261.26 260.46 260.06 256.76 260.38 257.06 
 LR tests (Wald χ2) 572.85*** 598.24*** 593.54*** 591.15*** 572.14*** 593.03*** 573.82*** 
 Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 
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Notes: This table presents results based on stochastic frontier one-step maximum likelihood estimation technique. Variable 
definitions are available in Table 4. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Figures in parentheses are the heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors.  
 
Table 8 Frontier regression results: Post-global crisis (GFC). 
Dependent variable: Cost 
efficiency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
  
Capital stringency (CS) 0.0309*** 0.0298*** 0.0269** 0.0275** 0.0290** 0.0267** 0.0276** 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0112) 
Supervisory power (SP) 0.0119** 0.0070 0.0082 0.0084* 0.0082* 0.0132** 0.0074 
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0051) 
Activity restriction (AR) -0.0258 -0.0504** -0.0391 -0.0417* -0.0373 -0.0410* -0.0455* 
(0.0267) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0272) (0.0243) (0.0248) 
Market discipline (MD) -0.0274 -0.0260 -0.0302 -0.0257 -0.0316* -0.0340* -0.0284 
(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0187) 
Deposit insurance (DI) -0.0958** -0.0868** -0.0885** -0.0912** -0.0936** -0.0928** -0.0896** 
(0.0377) (0.0384) (0.0380) (0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0376) (0.0379) 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 Ownership concentration 
(OC) 
0.123*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.134*** 0.150*** 0.135*** 0.150*** 
(0.0362) (0.0328) (0.0338) (0.0342) (0.0345) (0.0329) (0.0333) 
Government ownership 
(Govt.) 
0.0344 -0.0020 0.0311 0.0396 0.0297 0.0358 0.0114 
(0.0382) (0.0432) (0.0390) (0.0399) (0.0385) (0.0391) (0.0410) 
Foreign ownership (Foreign) 0.0029 -0.0050 -0.0108 0.0025 -0.0135 0.0084 -0.0042 
(0.0218) (0.0221) (0.0271) (0.0223) (0.0259) (0.0219) (0.0221) 
B
an
k
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Market power 0.582*** 0.592*** 0.576*** 0.582*** 0.567*** 0.596*** 0.587*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0605) (0.0611) (0.0610) (0.0613) (0.0600) (0.0609) 
Bank size -0.0053 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0053 -0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0035 
 (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0072) 
Equity  0.0057 0.0038 0.0052 0.0034 0.0029 0.0123 0.0029 
 (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0222) 
Deposit -0.0204 -0.0105 -0.0252 -0.0231 -0.0358 -0.0144 -0.0143 
 (0.0697) (0.0693) (0.0710) (0.0706) (0.0698) (0.0690) (0.0698) 
Loan growth 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Lending 0.0229 0.0037 0.0120 0.0120 0.0191 0.0269 -0.0043 
 (0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0660) (0.0656) (0.0657) (0.0670) 
M
ac
ro
  
Income level -0.226** -0.235** -0.262*** -0.232** -0.248** -0.255** -0.240** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.101) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) 
GDP growth 0.448* 0.497* 0.509* 0.463* 0.497* 0.446* 0.505* 
 (0.265) (0.268) (0.267) (0.267) (0.265) (0.267) (0.265) 
Interest -0.138 -0.148 -0.165* -0.153 -0.152 -0.142 -0.159 
 (0.0991) (0.0988) (0.0990) (0.0989) (0.0988) (0.0984) (0.0989) 
 OC*CS 0.0301   0.0333    
 (0.0235)   (0.0240)    
 OC*SP 0.0259*     0.0428**  
 (0.0157)     (0.0183)  
 OC*AR 0.117    0.0536   
 (0.0909)    (0.0929)   
 OC*MD 0.0095      -0.0465 
 (0.0466)      (0.0430) 
 GOVT*CS  0.0354  -0.0124    
  (0.0301)  (0.0289)    
 GOVT*SP  -0.0142    -0.0200  
  (0.0222)    (0.0225)  
 GOVT*AR  0.116   0.0327   
  (0.0870)   (0.0812)   
 GOVT*MD  0.0930*     0.0753 
  (0.0477)     (0.0490) 
 Foreign*CS   -0.0054 -0.0183    
   (0.0186) (0.0196)    
 Foreign*SP   -0.0098   -0.0270**  
   (0.0114)   (0.0134)  
 Foreign*AR   0.0566  0.0600   
   (0.0582)  (0.0578)   
 Foreign*MD   -0.0203    0.0062 
   (0.0346)    (0.0351) 
 Constant 2.228** 2.400*** 2.634*** 2.363*** 2.525*** 2.518*** 2.439*** 
  (0.874) (0.865) (0.869) (0.878) (0.862) (0.868) (0.868) 
 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Log likelihood 254.00 253.41 252.66 252.25 252.49 254.41 252.94 
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 LR tests (Wald χ2) 802.98*** 799.41*** 795.05*** 792.56*** 793.94*** 805.38*** 796.65*** 
 Observations 407 407 407 407 407 407 407 
Notes: This table presents results based on stochastic frontier one-step maximum likelihood estimation technique. Variable 
definitions are available in Table 4. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The 
figures in parentheses are the heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
 
Table 9 Frontier regression results: Profit efficiency. 
Panel A: Regulation and Ownership 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Profit Efficiency 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Capital stringency 
(CS) 
0.0030 0.0033 0.001 0.0083 0.0023 0.0021 0.0036 0.0041 
(0.010) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0109) 
Supervisory power 
(SP) 
0.0008 0.0027 0.0019 -0.0012 0.0010 0.0015 0.0027 0.0005 
(0.0055) (0.0062) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0055) 
Activity restrictions 
(AR) 
-0.0014 -0.0129 -0.0034 0.0060 0.0013 -0.0036 -0.0015 -0.0010 
(0.0294) (0.0310) (0.0296) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0316) (0.0294) (0.0293) 
Market discipline 
(MD) 
-0.0142 -0.0144 -0.00928 -0.0160 -0.0151 -0.0152 -0.0147 -0.0103 
(0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0153) 
Deposit insurance -0.0758* -0.0723* -0.0585 -0.0687* -0.0721* -0.0639 -0.0741* -0.0648 
(0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0402) 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
Own. Concentration 
(OC) 
0.0419 0.0383 0.0405 0.0356 0.0467 0.0417 0.0418 0.0355 
(0.0331) (0.0363) (0.0329) (0.0336) (0.0371) (0.0334) (0.0333) (0.0330) 
Govt. ownership 
(Govt.) 
0.0474 0.0469 0.0156 0.0615 0.0368 0.0400 0.0479 0.0363 
(0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0422) (0.0412) (0.0432) (0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0421) 
Foreign ownership 
(Foreign) 
-0.0353 -0.0326 -0.0443* -0.0385 -0.0415 -0.0462* -0.0332 -0.0433* 
(0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0287) (0.0273) (0.0279) (0.0261) (0.0258) 
B
an
k
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Market power 1.280*** 1.288*** 1.291*** 1.247*** 1.281*** 1.280*** 1.279*** 1.272*** 
(0.0670) (0.0677) (0.0667) (0.0680) (0.0672) (0.0677) (0.0673) (0.0672) 
Bank size 0.0183** 0.0167** 0.0176** 0.0166** 0.0180** 0.0164** 0.0180** 0.0160** 
(0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) 
Equity 0.0047 0.0072 0.0053 0.0074 0.0046 0.0057 0.0062 0.0079 
(0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0314) (0.0308) 
Deposit 0.0270 0.0312 0.0449 0.0232 0.0301 0.0194 0.0263 0.0501 
(0.0725) (0.0726) (0.0725) (0.0733) (0.0731) (0.0732) (0.0728) (0.0722) 
Loan growth 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0009*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Lending -0.169** -0.168** -0.206*** -0.200*** -0.170** -0.178** -0.167** -0.209*** 
(0.0709) (0.0713) (0.0713) (0.0712) (0.0712) (0.0709) (0.0710) (0.0716) 
M
ac
ro
  
Income level 0.0779 0.0738 0.0933 0.0582 0.0811 0.0723 0.0801 0.0779 
(0.0747) (0.0760) (0.0744) (0.0749) (0.0749) (0.0751) (0.0750) (0.0746) 
GDP growth -0.208 -0.190 -0.195 -0.183 -0.207 -0.194 -0.208 -0.192 
(0.244) (0.246) (0.246) (0.244) (0.245) (0.245) (0.248) (0.242) 
Interest -0.111 -0.111 -0.114 -0.125 -0.114 -0.122 -0.104 -0.116 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.116) 
 
 
Table 9 (continued) Frontier regression results: Profit efficiency. 
Panel B: Interaction Regulation and Ownership 
OC*CS  0.0002   -0.0065    
 (0.0232)   (0.0261)    
OC*SP  0.0124     0.0138  
 (0.0182)     (0.0223)  
OC*AR  -0.0991    -0.0913   
 (0.0891)    (0.0950)   
OC*MD  0.0026      0.0270 
39 
 
 (0.0382)      (0.0397) 
Govt*CS   -0.0088  0.0264    
  (0.0278)  (0.0304)    
Govt.*SP   -0.0016    0.0010  
  (0.0246)    (0.0261)  
Govt.*AR   -0.110   -0.0868   
  (0.0825)   (0.0879)   
Govt.*MD   0.121***     0.0837* 
  (0.0428)     (0.0464) 
Foreign*CS    -0.0139 0.0087    
   (0.0193) (0.0219)    
Foreign*SP    0.0045   -0.0015  
   (0.0136)   (0.0171)  
Foreign*AR    0.0137  0.0544   
   (0.0630)  (0.0657)   
Foreign*MD    -0.0976***    -0.0799** 
   (0.0327)    (0.0356) 
Constant -0.801 -0.758 -0.948 -0.618 -0.829 -0.721 -0.845 -0.797 
(0.653) (0.670) (0.650) (0.657) (0.660) (0.662) (0.656) (0.654) 
Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log 
likelihood 
190.24 191.22 195.63 195.02 190.63 192.13 190.49 197.28 
LR tests 
(Wald χ2) 
1125.47*** 1130.51*** 1153.42*** 1150.22*** 1127.44*** 1135.19*** 1126.76*** 1162.06*** 
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 715 
No. of banks 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Notes: This table presents results based on stochastic frontier one-step maximum likelihood estimation technique. Variable definitions are 
available in Table 4. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are the 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors.  
 
Table 10 Frontier regression results: Profit efficiency.  
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Profit Efficiency 
1 2 3 
All Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Capital stringency (CS) 0.0030 0.0104 0.0128 
(0.0107) (0.0195) (0.0164) 
Supervisory power (SP) 0.0008 0.0161 -0.0027 
(0.0055) (0.0153) (0.0073) 
Activity restrictions (AR) -0.0014 0.137 -0.0094 
(0.0294) (0.108) (0.0361) 
Market discipline (MD) -0.0142 0.0005 -0.0311 
(0.0149) (0.0233) (0.0274) 
Deposit insurance (DI) -0.0758* 0.174 -0.112** 
(0.0404) (0.196) (0.0560) 
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
 Own. concentration (OC) 0.0419 0.124*** -0.0006 
(0.0331) (0.0455) (0.0486) 
Govt. ownership (Govt.) 0.0474 0.0827 0.0491 
(0.0409) (0.0618) (0.0569) 
Foreign ownership (Foreign) -0.0353 -0.134*** -0.0040 
40 
 
(0.0259) (0.0446) (0.0323) 
 Market power 1.280*** 1.176*** 1.295*** 
B
an
k
 s
p
ec
if
ic
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
(0.0670) (0.112) (0.0892) 
Bank size 0.0183** 0.0026 0.0248** 
(0.0071) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
Equity 0.0047 -0.0495 0.0071 
(0.0311) (0.242) (0.0328) 
Deposit 0.0270 -0.0645 0.0743 
(0.0725) (0.108) (0.102) 
Loan growth 0.0010*** 0.0015*** 0.0008* 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Lending -0.169** -0.212* -0.284*** 
(0.0709) (0.117) (0.0973) 
M
ac
ro
  
Income level 0.0779 0.274** 0.199 
(0.0747) (0.130) (0.149) 
GDP growth -0.208 -0.457 0.0954 
(0.244) (0.368) (0.393) 
Interest -0.111 0.273 -0.0281 
(0.117) (0.357) (0.146) 
 Post-GFC -0.0917**   
  (0.0464)   
 Constant -0.710 -2.819** -1.799 
  (0.629) (1.190) (1.283) 
 Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 Log likelihood 190.24 119.15 91.98 
 LR tests (Wald χ2) 1125.47*** 665.34*** 575.54*** 
 Observations 715 308 407 
Notes: This table presents results based on stochastic frontier one-step maximum likelihood estimation technique. Variable definitions are 
available in Table 4. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The figures in parentheses are the 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors.  
 
 
Highlights: 
 Considers effects of bank regulation and supervision on bank efficiency in MENA. 
 Public rather than private view of bank regulation supported with cost efficiency. 
 Despite imperfect market competition, positive effects on cost/profit efficiency.  
 Ownership concentration had positive effects but government owned results mixed. 
 Positive improvements since the global crisis in a number of areas. 
 
